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India and South Africa have invested in nanotechnology since the early 2000s
and have identiﬁed risks to human health and the environment as an important
issue for governance. This is exemplary for a wider trend in which ‘developing
countries’ play an increasingly prominent role in the development, production
and use of emerging technologies. This validates the claim of the world risk
society thesis that countries around the world are now confronted with the risks
of emerging technologies. Little is known, however, about the way developing
countries deal with the potential risks of emerging technologies. Starting from
the observation that the risk colonization of nanotechnology in developing
countries cannot be taken for granted, this article draws upon the relational
theory of risk in order to investigate how nanotechnology became understood as
an object of risk in South Africa and India. The article shows that nanotechnol-
ogy was constituted as an object of risk in rather different ways in India and
South Africa, demonstrating that the spread of risk discourses – and the
emergence of a world risk society – cannot be understood without attending to
the local context. The article shows that way risk is understood and dealt with
changes as risk discourses travel around the world, giving many different faces
to the world risk society.
Keywords: travelling risk discourses; nanotechnology; developing countries;
India; South Africa; relational theory of risk
Introduction
India and South Africa have been investing in the emerging ﬁeld of nanotechnology
since the early 2000s and can be considered as front-runners amongst developing
countries (Court et al. 2004). Whereas the potential risks of nanotechnology have
long been absent from government policies and public debate, both governments
have meanwhile identiﬁed potential risks to human health and the environment as
an important issue for governance. This article investigates how nanotechnology
became understood as an object of risk by the South African and Indian govern-
ment, highlighting that the way risk discourses travel cannot be understood without
attending to the local context.
Nanotechnology can be deﬁned as the understanding and control of matter at the
nano-scale. At this scale, materials gain a number of new properties that may also
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give rise to new risk properties (Oberdörster, Stone, and Donaldson 2007; Hristozov,
Gottardo, and Critto 2012). The potential risks to human health and the environment
of nanotechnology are considered particularly important because the small size of
matter at the nano-scale allows it to ﬁnd applications in a wide range of products.
Since the early 2000s, a broad body of literature has emerged trying to ﬁnd ways to
deal with these risks. These studies range from toxicological research and the devel-
opment of guidance documents and standards to studies of regulatory procedures,
the costs of risk research, and public engagement activities (e.g. Oberdörster, Stone,
and Donaldson 2007; Pidgeon and Rogers-Hayden 2007; Choi, Ramachandran, and
Kandlikar 2009; Dhawan et al. 2011; Erbis et al. 2016).
Materials at the nano-scale are expected to be widely used in both ‘developed’
and ‘developing’ countries. The spread of nanotechnology risks thus validates of the
world risk society thesis (Beck 1999), at least to the extent that the risks to human
health and the environment that were ﬁrst considered characteristic for modern
industrialized societies have now spread beyond the conﬁnes of the world’s wealthi-
est nations that ﬁrst witnessed their emergence. Countries like India and South
Africa are increasingly exposed to the risks of emerging technologies as they do not
only import these technologies but increasingly also develop and produce them. Yet
while it is beyond doubt that countries around the world are increasingly exposed to
risks of emerging technologies, little is known about the way risks are dealt with
outside the world’s wealthiest nations.
This article aims to open up this ﬁeld of enquiry by seeking to explain how
nanotechnology became constituted as a risk object by the Indian and South African
governments. Drawing on the relational theory of risk that approaches risk as a
quality ascribed to an object through a social process, I will show that nanotechnol-
ogy became a risk in rather different ways and that the way nanotechnology was
eventually constituted as an object of risk by the governments cannot be understood
without attending to the local context. The way risk is understood and dealt with
changes as risk discourses travel around the globe, giving many different faces to
the world risk society.
Nanotechnology risks
Nanotechnology risks are an interesting case to explore the spread of risk discourses
beyond the world’s wealthiest nations. The concern that nanotechnology could
potentially pose risks to human health and the environment ﬁrst rose to prominence
in North America and Europe in the early 2000s. Several toxicological studies indi-
cated that some nanomaterials may have toxic properties, demonstrating at the very
least that there was considerable uncertainty about the safety of nanotechnology
(e.g. Oberdörster 2000; Poland et al. 2008). In the following years, concerns about
nanotechnology risks quickly rose to prominence following a series of high-proﬁle
publications. For instance in 2003, the ETC Group published a review of toxicology
studies in which they called for a moratorium on nanotechnology and in the follow-
ing year the British Royal Society and the Royal Academy of Engineering released
an inﬂuential report in which they called for more sustained efforts to deal with the
potential risks of nanotechnology. Publications like these and others gave rise to
efforts to ﬁnd appropriate methods for testing nanomaterials, labeling nanotechnol-
ogy products, developing codes of conduct and applying the precautionary principle
(e.g. see Renn and Roco 2006; Maynard et al. 2006). Importantly, amongst others
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informed by recent experiences with a public backlash against genetically modiﬁed
organisms in Northern America and Europe, also pro-active attempts were made to
engage the public in the governance of nanotechnology risks (e.g. see Pidgeon and
Rogers-Hayden 2007; Bowman and Hodge 2007).
While the nanotechnology risk discourse emerged in North America and Europe,
so-called ‘developing countries’ or ‘countries from the global South’ became particu-
larly active in nanotechnology. Already in 2005 over 30 countries from the global
South were active in nanotechnology (Maclurcan 2005) and several developing coun-
tries are shared amongst the leading countries worldwide in terms of publications
(Zhou and Leydesdorff 2006; Huang, Notten, and Rasters 2011). This is indicative
for a wider trend where developing country investments ensure that emerging
technologies are no longer the exclusive domain of the West. In 1990, developing
countries carried out less than ﬁve percent of research and development. In 2002 this
number had risen to over 17% and in 2007 developing countries accounted for no less
than 24% of research and development worldwide (UNESCO 2010). Especially
emerging economies like China, India, Brazil and South Africa are increasingly active
at the technological frontier, not only as producers providing labor, but increasingly
also as consumers and developers. South Africa was one of the ﬁrst countries in the
world to publish a national nanotechnology strategy and India has even been catego-
rized as a front-runner in nanotechnology worldwide (Court et al. 2004), ranking
sixth worldwide in terms of the number of publications, ahead of countries like
France and the Netherlands (Beumer and Bhattacharya 2013).
The spread of nanotechnology around the world thus conﬁrms the claim that we
live in a world risk society (Beck 1999), at least to the extent countries worldwide
are exposed to risks of modern technologies. But this does not mean that risk as a
governance concept occupies a similarly central spot on the public agenda of India
and South Africa as it does in reﬂexively modern societies. Nor does it imply that
countries like India and South Africa deal with risks in the same way. First of all,
there is some anecdotal evidence suggesting that we cannot take for granted that risk
discourses are so widely spread in India and South Africa. Asbestos, for instance,
which unequivocally is regarded as a risk object in Europe and North America, is
almost entirely unregulated by the Government of India. India is the world’s biggest
asbestos importer and it is a $2 billion industry with double-digit annual growth. As
recent as 2011, the Indian supreme court refused to ban asbestos. And in South
Africa, information about the health risks of nuclear materials was actively withheld
from the workforce in the mines up until the late 1990s (McCulloch 2005; Hecht
2012). Certainly risk discourses have emerged in India and South Africa in the case
of other technologies, such as agricultural biotechnology (Damodaran 1999; Cloete,
Nel, and Theron 2006; Falkner and Gupta 2009) but the absence of similar dis-
courses in cases of technologies that are ﬁrmly understood in terms of risk in Europe
and North America demonstrates this cannot be taken for granted.
Secondly, even in cases where risk discourses did emerge, there are theoretical
reasons warranting us from assuming that the governments in India and South Africa
interpret risk in the same way. For instance, the critical potential of the risk society
thesis lies with the observation that modern risks are still dealt with by the
institutions associated with ﬁrst modernity (Beck, Giddens, and Lash 1994). But it is
safe to say that countries like India and South Africa did not go through the
particular form of modernization that it implied to precede the stage of reﬂexive
modernity and we cannot assume the institutional arrangements associated with the
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ﬁrst modernity are present in similar shapes. Sociologists and historians have
likewise pointed out that the concept of risk ﬁnds its origins in Europe and that the
history of the concept is closely connected to various developments in European his-
tory, including the expansion of long-distance trade and the associated emergence of
insurance schemes (Luhmann 1993) and the rise of mathematics used by expanding
nation-states as a tool for explaining hazard and change (Hacking 1990). The
emergence of risk discourses outside of Europe, in places marked by different histo-
ries and modernities, thus invariably raises the question how nanotechnology was
constituted as an object that poses risks.
Despite the prominence of nanotechnology on the Indian and South African pub-
lic agenda, there are thus good reasons not to automatically posit that risk occupies
a central spot on the public agenda. Nevertheless the potential risks of nanotechnol-
ogy currently are identiﬁed as an important issue for governance by governments in
both India and South Africa (Sarma 2011; Musee, Brent, and Ashton 2010; Beumer
2016). This raises the question how risk discourses emerge in India and South
Africa – how risk discourses ‘travel’ from one place to another. Nanotechnology risk
in India and South Africa are particularly interesting cases to study the way risk
discourses emerge because risk discourses emerged only several years after nan-
otechnology concerns were articulated in terms of risk in other countries around the
world, most notable in Europe and North America, thus allowing a clearer view on
the way such discourses travel.
Theoretical background
Over the last 15 years several approaches have been developed that take a construc-
tivist view on the phenomenon of risk. For instance, the relational theory of risk
deﬁnes ‘risk’ as the result of the process during which an object is qualiﬁed as
having a potentially negatively inﬂuence on something that is valued, i.e. an object
at risk (Boholm and Corvellec 2011; Boholm et al. 2015), constructivist approaches
to risk approach ‘risk’ as a quality ascribed to an object through a social process
(Borraz 2008; Hermans 2014), and social representation approaches to risk empha-
size how the understanding of particular phenomena in terms of risk is the outcome
of sociocultural, historical, and group-speciﬁc forces (e.g. Joffe 2003; Bauer 2002).
All three approaches highlight the importance of the attribution of meaning and con-
textual aspects that are involved in understanding and treating phenomena as risks.
In analyzing the way nanotechnology became a risk, I will draw upon the rela-
tional view of risk (Boholm and Corvellec 2011) because this is especially designed
to allow the analyst to draw attention to the fact that this ‘qualiﬁcation’ rests upon
views about what constitutes harm and evidence that may diverge between different
actors, times, and places. This approach has subsequently been used to explain the
cause and persistence of controversies about whether or not something ‘constitutes a
hazardous object’ (Boholm et al. 2015) by pointing out that actors held different
views about what can be considered an object at risk, about the evidence required to
establish a credible connection between risk objects and objects at risk, and about
the consequences that such a connection should be accompanied with. While not
denying the fact that some objects can cause harm to human health or the environ-
ment, the relational perspective instead shifts the focus away from the question
whether or not something can be considered as risk toward the process through
which objects are (or are not) constituted as objects of risk by particular actors.
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The relational theory can be used to answer ‘questions about why and how
something is considered a risk’ (Boholm and Corvellec 2011) and is therefore well-
suited to investigate how nanotechnology was constituted as an object of risk by the
governments of India and South Africa.
For the purpose of studying nanotechnology in South Africa and India, it is
important to emphasize that the processes by which an objects of risk is constituted
are highly context-dependent. Comparative research in risk regulation has highlighted
the different ways in which countries calculate, evaluate, compare and manage risk
objects (Vogel 1986; Löfstedt and Vogel 2001; Jasanoff 2005). At least a part of the
geographical differences in the way objects are constituted as risk objects ﬁnd their
origin in long-established valuations of what can be considered harmful and what can
be considered valid evidence. For instance Jasanoff (2005) points out that the British
practice of delegating decisions about biotechnology risks to policy ofﬁcials is closely
associated to the long-standing conceptions of the public servant as persons of proven
standing while in the United States the constitution of risk objects relied on interested
parties such as industry, environmentalists, and academic researchers. And at a differ-
ent level, when considering the constitution of nanotechnology as an object of risk in
India and South Africa, it should be pointed out that the emergence of the modern
concept of risk cannot be separated from the eighteenth-century European notions of
agency and values that emphasized liberal, rationalistic and pragmatic virtue (Giddens
1990; Luhmann 1993; Bernstein 1996; Reith 2004; Boholm 2015). The contemporary
meaning of ‘risk’ thus has ‘considerable historic longevity of a persistent mentality
centred upon ideas about human agency, value, gains and losses’ (Boholm 2015),
whose origins are to be found in Europe.
Certainly the fact that risk discourses are situated in time and place does not pre-
vent them from travelling from one place to another, or from one technology to
another. Rothstein and others (Power 2004; Rothstein, Huber, and Gaskell 2006;
Huber and Rothstein 2013) have for instance observed how in ‘the developed West’
more and more practices are framed in terms of risk, ‘colonizing’ the public agenda,
as it were, in order to reﬂexively manage institutional threats. But the context-
dependent historical emergence of risk discourses does provide a valid starting point
for understanding what factors facilitate or hamper new objects to be understood in
terms of risk and to understand how both risk and the new context change in the
process. The wide variety of conditions and factors that facilitated the emergence of
risk discourses in Europe and North America should subsequently sensitize the
analyst in studying risk discourses in India and South Africa.
The constitution of a risk object is thus understood as a reciprocal process
whereby risk changes the way objects are viewed and dealt with in the new context
while simultaneously the conditions present in the new context changes the meaning
of objects at risk. This insight is closely related to approaches drawing on govern-
mentality theory that approach risk as a discourse that structures ideas and practices
related to uncertainty and harm (Dean 1999; Jasanoff 1999). Scholars have pointed
out that risk, as a speciﬁc discourse about the steering and planning of human action
in society, comes along with speciﬁc techniques of calculation, decision-making,
accountability and foresight (Dean 1999; Reith 2004; Power 2007). As Boholm
aptly summarized: ‘The concept of risk is therefore accompanied by techniques for
making decisions, by modes of praxis and by organizational routines that implicate
power relations between expert and layperson, decision maker and stakeholder’
(Boholm 2015, 7). The use of the term ‘risk discourse’, rather than the notion of
1366 K. Beumer
‘risk’ that is used in the relational theory of risk, serves to highlight the way ‘risk’
structures ideas and practices in ways that have practical consequences. Asking how
nanotechnology became a risk hence does not only require investigating the way
objects become established as constituting a risk, but also includes investigating the
way that this (re)structures ideas and practices related to uncertainty and harm.
Methodology and sources
The emergence of risk discourses concerning nanotechnology in India and South
Africa is traced by a combination of semi-structured qualitative interviews and
in-depth document analysis. I have conducted ﬁfty-seven in-depth qualitative
interviews with key stakeholders who have been involved in Indian and South
African nanotechnology since the early days. Interviewees were identiﬁed in a vari-
ety of documents and websites (including scientiﬁc publications, newspaper articles,
and conference attendance lists.) and through a snowball method by asking intervie-
wees for names of individuals involved in nanotechnology. Interviews were held at
over thirty different institutes during ﬁve months of ﬁeldwork (see Table 1 for an
overview). These include government departments, universities, research councils,
NGOs, metrology organizations, and industries.
Next to this I systematically gathered a wide variety of publically available
documents, including policy documents, political speeches, newspaper articles, insti-
tutional mandates, websites, leaﬂets, cartoons, and public lectures. These documents
were collected during the ﬁeldwork periods, by systematically searching through the
websites of national and international organizations involved in nanotechnology, and
by systematically searching a variety of databases and search engines (Web of
Knowledge, EBSCOHOST, Google Scholar, and Google). Together, the interviews
and documents provide a rich body of sources for analyzing the way nanotechnol-
ogy became a risk for the governments of India and South Africa.
India
Risk as a non-issue
How did risk as a discourse that organizes ideas and practices around nanotech-
nology emerge in India? For a long time, risk to human health and the environ-
ment were not an issue in Indian nanotechnology. The government ﬁrst started
investing in nanotechnology in 2001 through a scheme called the Nano Science
and Technology Initiative and stepped up its investments under the Eleventh Five
Year Plan (2007–2012) when a program named Nano Mission was launched that
provided funding for centers of excellence, laboratory equipment, and research
projects throughout the country. This funding program was initiated at the
Department of Science and Technology based on the idea that investments in
advanced technologies are a requirement for attaining development. By keeping
up with the scientiﬁc frontier, India could be propelled onto the world stage, even
making it a world leader (Beumer 2015). As the Planning Commission noted
when discussing the potential beneﬁts of nanotechnology for ICT, nanotechnology
‘represents a “make or break” opportunity, capable of catapulting India into a high
growth orbit and on a fast track to becoming a developed nation’ (Planning
Commission 2008, 252).
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In Europe and Northern America, debates about risks to human health and the
environment had ensued not long after the ﬁrst Indian investments in nanotechnol-
ogy, following publications by organizations such as the Canada-based ETC group
and the British Royal Society and Royal Academy for Engineering (ETC Group
2003; RS & RAE 2004). But these European and American debates did not
automatically trigger similar discussions in India. Whereas by the mid-2000s several
programs had been started in Europe and Northern America for trying to ﬁnd ways
to deal with nanotechnology risks, the Government of India exclusively focused on
the developmental beneﬁts of the technology. For a long time the only time that a
government ofﬁcial publically spoke about risks, was when Vice-President Hamid
Ansari noted in 2008 that ‘new and revolutionary technologies always come as a
package – with the promise of new opportunities and the threat of new risks’
(AZoNano 2008). The government’s activities were limited to occasionally funding
Table 1. Institutional afﬁliations of interviewees.
Country Institute
India Bureau of Indian Standards
Central Drug Research Institute
Department of Information Technology
Department of Science and Technology
Development Alternatives
DSM India Innovation Center
Indian Institute of Chemical Technology
Indian Institute of Technology Delhi
Indian Institute of Toxicological Research
Jawaharlal Nehru University
National Council for Science and Technology Communication
National Institute for Science, Technology And Development Studies
National Institute of Pharmaceutical Education and Research
National Physics Laboratory
Public Health Foundation of India
Research and Information System for Developing Countries
South Asian University
Technology Information, Forecasting and Assessment Council
The Energy and Resource Institute
University of Hyderabad
Vigyan Prasar
South Africa Council for Scientiﬁc and Industrial Research
Department of Science and Technology
iThemba LABS
National Institute of Occupational Health
National Metrology Institute of South Africa
National Research Foundation
Prime Product Ltd.
South African Agency for Science and Technology Advancement
South African Bureau of Standards
Tshwane University of Technology





risk research projects through the Nano Mission and a largely failed attempt to
develop guidelines to assist the regulatory approval of nanotechnology-based drugs.
The development of these guidelines was started in 2006 at the National Institute of
Pharmaceutical Education and Research. In 2011, it was already observed that ‘after
ﬁve years, there is no word on its progress’ (Sachan 2011) and when interviewing a
leading toxicologist involved in the program in 2012, these guidelines seemed to
have been abandoned entirely. Ofﬁcial government documents did not even mention
risks once until 2010, almost a decade after the government started investing.
Non-governmental organizations
Whenever risk did emerge on the public agenda in these early days, this was pre-
dominantly due to the efforts of various non-governmental actors. Most prominent
amongst these were The Energy and Resource Institute, a civil society organization
working on issues of governance, and the Institute for Toxicology Research, a public
research institute that is part of the Council for Scientiﬁc and Industrial Research
(CSIR).
The Energy and Resource Institute (TERI) ﬁrst started working on nanotechnol-
ogy in 2007 after receiving funding from the Canadian development organization
for a project on capacity building for nanotechnology governance. Risk soon took
an important place in their work. They wrote a series of reports and organized sev-
eral workshops aiming to spread awareness about nanotechnology risks, urging the
government to take action to mitigate the potential harm (TERI 2008, 2009a).
TERI’s emphasis on risks partly emerged in response to a lack of government activi-
ties in the area. As Srivastava and Chowdhury, two employees of TERI, put it in
2008: ‘the entire orientation of the current institutional and policy framework is
towards strengthening technology development and its uptake by the industry. This
has meant a signiﬁcant neglect of the regulatory aspects relating to environmental,
health, safety and ethical dimensions’ (Srivastava and Chowdhury 2008). But the
understanding of possible downsides of nanotechnology in terms of risks was also
informed by academic literature from North American and European authors.
Enabled by Canadian funding, their work extensively compared the lack of Indian
risk governance with the way foreign – mostly European and North American –
countries addressed these issues (TERI 2009b, 2010). The fact that the TERI team
consisted not only of natural scientists but also social scientists may furthermore
help in understanding the way TERI made sense of nanotechnology as both an
opportunity and a risk (see Bertoldo et al. 2016).
The Indian Institute for Toxicology Research (IITR) started working on
nanotechnology risks two years before, in 2005. Whereas natural scientists have
generally been found to represent nanotechnology in terms of opportunities rather
than risks (Bertoldo et al. 2016; Besley, Kramer, and Priest 2008), the research
group’s focus on toxicology naturally directed these researchers to constitute
nanotechnology as an object of risk. The researcher who initiated much of these
activities had ﬁrst learned about nanotechnology risks in 2005 while on a sabbatical
leave in the United States and upon returning in India he managed to acquire labora-
tory equipment required for studying materials at the nano-scale. He mentioned: ‘I
was initially met with scepticism and I had trouble getting the right instruments.
Luckily, my director did see the potential importance of my work and allowed me to
go ahead with it’ (interview 9 December 2010). The equipment was purchased using
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funds that are annually earmarked for CSIR institutes, thus largely falling outside
the direct control of the Department of Science and Technology. In the years that
followed, the IITR developed a highly visible research group in nanotoxicology.
The research group occasionally received funding from nanotechnology programs
such as the Nano Mission but a substantial part of their funds were also derived
from participation in European framework program projects like NanoLINEN and
NanoValid. Their work was published in various international journals and the group
also made a sustained effort to give visibility to their ﬁndings within India by com-
municating their results in local journals and newsletters.
In the wake of the IITR work, other research institutes also started working on
nanotoxicology. The governmental funding schemes that occasionally funded the
IITR also provided ad hoc funds to other institutes investigating nanotechnology
risks and there is some evidence that also other government bodies started to fund
risk research, including the Indian Council for Medical Research and the Ministry of
Environment and Forests. By the end of the 2010s, a series of research institutes
were conducting risk research, including the Indian Institute for Toxicology
Research, the Indian Institute of Chemical Technology, the Amrita Center for
Nanosciences, the Central Drug Research Institute, the National Institute of
Pharmaceutical Education and Research, and the All India Institute of Medical
Sciences (Jayanthi, Beumer, and Bhattacharya 2012).
By the end of the decade, individuals involved with nanotechnology at universi-
ties, research councils, standardization organizations and industry spoke about the
downsides of nanotechnology in terms of risk. Several of these actors had learned
about nanotechnology risks through the work of TERI and the various research insti-
tutes mentioned above. But the discourse of nanotechnology risk also traveled from
Europe and Northern America in more incidental ways. The majority of interviewees
told me that they ﬁrst heard about nanotechnology risks and the need to deal with
them when attending conferences abroad, from foreign collaborators, international
newspapers and newsletters, or simply by using Google. The results was that by
2010 pretty much all actors involved in nanotechnology argued that the government
should address the potential risks of nanotechnology.
Announcing a regulatory board
When the government announced a regulatory board for nanotechnology in January
2010, however, another event played a catalyzing role. Not the increasingly diverse
support for risk governance, but the Indian ban on genetically modiﬁed eggplant
triggered the government into action. Agricultural biotechnology had long been a
controversial topic in India, but biotechnology had thus far been dealt with in a lar-
gely technocratic manner. This changed by the end of 2009 when the new environ-
mental minister organized a set of public hearings and on the basis of these put a
moratorium on genetically modiﬁed eggplant, or Bt brinjal (Shah 2011). While sev-
eral concerns lie at the basis of this controversy, including private ownership over
agricultural input and the ensuing dependency of small-holder farmers on multina-
tional companies, the decisions were nevertheless largely framed in terms of risks to
human health and the environment. For those government ofﬁcials in charge of
nanotechnology affairs, this unprecedented development in the Indian context was a
clear signal that public concerns about risks could indeed affect government con-
duct. Even if evidence on public concerns about nanotechnology risks was entirely
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absent (Beumer 2014), the ban on Bt brinjal nevertheless generated a situation
similar to Europe and North America, where the emergence of nanotechnology risk
discourses was strongly shaped by concerns over public opposition to genetically
modiﬁed organisms, as was described in the section on ‘nanotechnology risk’. As
one prominent nanotechnology scientist said: ‘the reason we had problems with Bt
brinjal is because we don’t have a strong regulatory body’ (C.N.R. Rao quoted in
Sarma 2011). The moratorium on Bt brinjal was announced in the ﬁrst week of
January 2010 and two weeks later the head of the Nano Mission announced a regu-
latory board responsible for taking care of nanotechnology risks.
The regulatory board was initiated by the Nano Mission at the Department of
Science and Technology. There were several other governmental divisions that were
perhaps more obvious candidates for taking up the discourse of risk in addressing
nanotechnology concerns. For instance the Ministry of Health and Family Welfare,
the Ministry of Environment and Forests, and the Ministry of Labor each have man-
dates that could accommodate the task of addressing nanotechnology risks (TERI
2009a; Sarma 2011). The Department of Science and Technology on the other hand
is mandated to promote science and technology and several commentators critically
argued that their promotional orientation may conﬂict with their activities in address-
ing risks (Sarma 2011; Jayanthi, Beumer, and Bhattacharya 2012). Yet it was the
Department of Science and Technology that took the lead in its capacity of the nodal
agency for nanotechnology.
The step to institutionalize risk discourses by establishing a regulatory board,
rather than for instance urging existing regulatory bodies to include nanotechnology
risks, to some extent follows from the nature of the technology. Centralizing the
governance of risks can be said to be beneﬁcial in the case of a technology whose
applications span different sectors; the fact that nanoparticles can be used in a vari-
ety of sectors could be an argument not to organize the governance of risks along
sectorial lines. But the establishment of a separate regulatory board should also be
understood with reference to other domains where risk discourses have emerged in
India. For instance in the case of biotechnology, which we already saw had a direct
inﬂuence on the emergence of a risk discourse in nanotechnology, the government
also decided to create a set of new institutes responsible for risks to human health
and the environment. This stands in a long tradition of ‘mission-oriented research’
in India (Raina 2012). Building upon notions of big science, this refers to the idea
that technological advances can best be achieved by creation ‘mission-oriented’
institutes that are exclusively dedicated to a technological ﬁeld, thereby enabling
people with different backgrounds and interests to work toward a shared goal
(Kalam 2012). These institutes were then accompanied by another institute responsi-
ble for governing possible risks – like the Nano Mission nowadays, and like
technologies like biotechnology, space research, and nuclear energy before it.
The announcement of the regulatory board was the ﬁrst time the government
adopted the discourse of risk in the case of nanotechnology. After the announcement
of the regulatory board in 2010, however, little visible activities took place and calls
for government action persisted. For instance, in 2011, two major Indian companies
called for government action by publically announcing that they abstained from
developing nanotechnology products because of a lack of regulatory standards
(Bakshi 2011). The little government work that has been done in the last few years
was moreover obscured by the rather non-transparent manner in which the regula-
tory board proceeded. For instance, the Nano Mission director informed me in an
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interview in 2012 that the committee had produced guidelines for dealing with
nanotechnology in research laboratories, following the work of researchers from the
IITR who had earlier published a guidance document for dealing with nanomaterials
in the workplace (Dhawan et al. 2011). The guidelines, however, were not yet
available because they were still under discussion within the Department of Science
and Technology (and to the best of the author’s knowledge they still have not been
published).
Government activities
In recent years the regulatory board (now referred to as an expert committee) has
nevertheless initiated several activities. But while one can say India had hereby
adopted the risk discourses on nanotechnology that had earlier emerged in Northern
America and Europe, this by no means implies that India governs risks in the same
way as European and North American countries. Through qualitative interviews with
several members of the expert committee as well as close observers, it can be dis-
cerned that their work mainly consists of developing the guidelines mentioned
above, monitoring how risks are dealt with internationally, and at times funding risk
research.
The Government of India positions its own activities in addressing risk as a
small part of a global ﬁeld of scientiﬁc inquiry. Government ofﬁcials for instance
pointed out that ‘as a developing country’, India cannot be expected to take the lead
and rather should follow what the rest of the world is doing (interview 12 November
2012). This interpretation of risk as an international ﬁeld thus served to limit the
activities required for addressing risk concerns to following the activities of
‘developed’ countries. This was for instance translated into the task of monitoring
international risk governance efforts. Also the guidelines mentioned above follow
this logic as they are were designed by combining elements of several guidelines
developed abroad. Apart from the question whether such a wait and see approach
will be beneﬁcial for India as it may imply that crucial decisions about the design of
risk governance strategies are left to countries with rather different socioeconomic
conditions and interests, it is also worth pointing out that this way of framing risk
stands in sharp contrast to the way beneﬁts are framed in India. When it comes to
risk, India positions itself as a developing country with limited resources, while it
positions itself as a potential world leader when it comes to the beneﬁts.
The government’s work is further characterized by a regulatory approach in
which regulatory action is only justiﬁed when supported by certain knowledge. This
ﬁts within a broader trend in the Indian governance of nanotechnology whereby
science is given a central role in decision-making (and claims and concerns by other
actors are regularly dismissed) (Beumer 2016). In interviews with government ofﬁ-
cials, it was repeatedly made explicit that the government will only take action when
international experts arrive at a consensus about both the existence of risks and the
best mechanisms for dealing with those risks. This approach speaks of a notion of
risk that is sharply distinct from what can be termed ‘uncertain risks’ (van Asselt
and Vos 2008). While the uncertainties concerning the effects of nanotechnology on
human health and the environment did not prevent several measures to be taken in
other countries, often under the umbrella of the precautionary principle, in the Indian
context these uncertain risks provide insufﬁcient justiﬁcation for any action other
than risk research. A prominent Indian nanotechnology scientist summed this up
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quite effectively when noting that there are ‘many things we don’t know yet. But
once we know we must take care’ (interview December 15, 2010).
The risk discourse from the Indian Government further structured the way con-
cerns were addressed by portraying risks and beneﬁts as a trade-off. Besides the
insistence that no regulatory action can be taken in the presence of scientiﬁc uncer-
tainty, another important concern was the fear that regulations may hinder techno-
logical progress. The director of the Nano Mission for instance emphasized that
whereas the government initiated the expert-committee because they want to avoid
being careless, they equally want to avoid over-regulating nanotechnology because
this may stiﬂe technological development. While a valid point in and of itself, this is
nevertheless a curious thing to say in a context where no concrete regulations have
been introduced and companies refrain from putting nanotechnology products on the
markets because of the lack of regulatory standards.
This is not unique to the Indian Government. Also scholars drawing attention to
the potential developmental beneﬁts of nanotechnology have argued that dealing
with risks should not currently be the priority for developing countries. Overly
addressing risk concerns could shy away developing countries from investing in this
promising technology, so the argument went, hence pre-empting the development of
beneﬁcial technologies (Court et al. 2004). In a similar vein, the government in India
pushed for the beneﬁts ﬁrst, putting the potential risks between brackets, as some-
thing that can be dealt with later.
Risk discourses did eventually successfully travel to India and were adopted by
the national government. Nanotechnology was constituted as an object of risk
through the efforts of civil society organizations and toxicology researchers, through
more mundane channels like conference visits and the use of Google, and in
response to public discussions about biotechnology in India. In line with the tradi-
tion of mission-oriented research, the responsibility to deal with risks was laid down
with a separate institute, whose activities were limited by its position as a develop-
ing country with limited resources, which could only take action in case of sufﬁcient
certainty and after ensuring the beneﬁts were not threatened.
South Africa
Risk as a non-issue
How did risk as a discourse that organizes ideas and practices around nanotechnology
emerge in South Africa? The origins of South Africa’s engagement with nanotechnol-
ogy lie in 2002, when the Department of Science and Technology requested a group
of scientists to discuss the possibilities to participate in the European Framework Pro-
gramme. The thematic priority on nanotechnology and nanosciences was open for
participation of non-European countries and South African scientists may be able to
get some funding. The group of scientists formed an organization, the South African
Nanotechnology initiative (SANi), which helped articulating the role of nanotechnol-
ogy in South Africa. In 2006, the parliament adopted a national nanotechnology strat-
egy which was jointly written by SANi and the Department of Science and
Technology, and the government provided an initial fund of 450.000 Rand (about
60.000 Euros) over three years. The government has since increased the ﬁnancial
means available and funded research projects, created a nanotechnology equipment
funding scheme, and established several centers of excellence, amongst others.
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As in India, the government and the scientiﬁc community were long silent about
risk. The 2006 nanotechnology strategy does not mention the term risk and makes
only a general reference to the need for addressing concerns about health and the
environment when noting that the government should analyze and introduce ‘legisla-
tive instruments to ensure that Nanotechnology is applied according to international
best practice in industrial and environmental safety standards’ (DST 2006, 5).
Instead, the focus was strongly on achieving beneﬁts in what were called the ‘soci-
etal cluster’ and the ‘industrial cluster’. The social cluster refers to the development
of nanotechnology applications that could help solving problems related to the qual-
ity of life, in particular in the areas of water, energy, and health. The industrial clus-
ter refers to applications that could strengthen South Africa’s competitiveness by
developing applications for the country’s main industries in the ﬁelds of mining and
minerals, chemical and bioprocessing, and materials and manufacturing. Whereas
India aimed to achieve development objectives by being at the global scientiﬁc fore-
front, South Africa focused on applications in areas that had prior been identiﬁed as
national priorities (Beumer 2015). Yet despite the diverging ways in which nan-
otechnology was expected to contribute to development objectives, in both countries
risks were initially no part of their strategies.
Rapid adoption
The way nanotechnology was constituted as an object of risk diverged from India in
that two of the main actors in India – civil society and toxicologist – were less vocal
in South Africa. The absence of civil society organizations in South African nan-
otechnology discussions stands out as remarkable, as civil society has played a
prominent role in the emergence of nanotechnology risk discourses around the world
(e.g. ETC Group 2003; Krabbenborg 2013). South African toxicology researchers
started working on nanotechnology in the second half of the previous decade and by
2008 at least six research institutes were working on the topic, including the
National institute of Occupational Health, the Council for Scientiﬁc and Industrial
Research, and the University of Pretoria, Stellenbosch University, the University of
Witwatersrand and Rhodes University (Musee 2009) but the scope and visibility of
their work initially remained limited (Beumer 2016). Instead, risk discourses trav-
elled to South Africa mainly through the more ‘mundane’ channels that we also saw
in India. Interviewees mentioned they had ﬁrst heard about the potential risks of
nanotechnology through scientiﬁc journals, the Meridian Institute newsletter on nan-
otechnology and development, contacts with colleagues at international conferences,
and other informal contacts with scientists from Europe and North America. By the
turn of the decade, like in India, most actors involved in nanotechnology in South
Africa were well-aware of nanotechnology risk.
As compared to India, where civil society organizations and prominent toxicolo-
gists publically spoke out on the need to govern nanotechnology risk, in South
Africa nanotechnology was ﬁrst constituted as an object of risk in a more dispersed
manner through the Internet, email lists, and foreign collaborations, leading one to
expect that risk discourses was adopted both slower and less widespread in South
Africa. But this is not what happened: in South Africa risks were widely circulated
and were quickly embraced by actors across the board.
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This can partly be attributed to the role of science and technology in post-
Apartheid South Africa. When the African National Congress (ANC) ﬁnally rose to
power in 1994, the priorities were ﬁrmly put on issues of employment, housing, agri-
cultural land and other issues that could serve to undo the inequalities of Apartheid.
Unlike India, where nanotechnology was considered a force of change that could turn
the country into a developed country, in South Africa science and technology were
not on top of the public agenda (Marais and Pienaar 2010). Where in 1991 South
Africa spent 1.03% of its gross domestic product on research and development, this
had dropped to a mere 0.68% in 1997 (Cherry 2006). As one interviewee made clear:
science and technology is bidding against Higher Education which is creating schools
in rural areas. Then it is competing with the Department of Health, which is putting
clinics in those places. Then we compete with the Department of Houses where you
need to make homes for the poor and the Department of Water Affairs where you want
to get good quality of water running through theses homes. (interview 4 October 2011)
This helps to explain why the nanotechnology strategy focuses on developing appli-
cations that serve well-established national priorities in water, energy, health and
mining. And it also helps to explain the emergence of the earlier mentioned South
African Nanotechnology initiative (SANi) as the organization where South African
actors involved in nanotechnology organized themselves. In a context where science
and technology were struggling to retain the little funds it had, scientists across the
board had to speak in one voice. Consequently, when nanotechnology was ﬁrst con-
stituted as an object of risk in emails, foreign newsletters, and conferences, this was
quickly circulated within the SANi network and was widely quickly embraced as a
legitimate concern, including by the South African Government.
Government activities
While the 2006 nanotechnology strategy did not mention the term risk once, in
2007 the Department of Science and Technology announced the creation of a
research platform to investigate the risks of nanotechnology to health, safety, and
the environment (HSE). The main task of the HSE platform was to identify research
priorities and they set out by creating a review of international scientiﬁc publications
on nanotoxicology and making ‘an inventory of the nanoproducts and nanomaterials
in use, production or imported in South Africa’ (Musee 2009). When the govern-
ment ofﬁcially launched the HSE platform in at a 2009 workshop, the mandate of
the platform had expanded from coordinating risk research to ensuring safety itself.
The civil servant in charge noted at the workshop that the research platform has ‘its
core focus on uncovering and mitigating health, safety and risk issues associated
with research development and application of nanotechnology’ (Molapisi 2009
[italics added]).
By the end of the same year, however, their plans changed when South Africa
received an invitation to the OECD working party on manufactured nanomaterials.
South Africa ﬁrst attended a meeting in late 2009 and its approach toward nanotech-
nology risk has been strongly informed by its participation in the working party ever
since. In particular, this meant that the South African priorities in risk research were
aligned to the work of the OECD working party. In 2007, the working party had
decided to limit their risk assessments to a restricted number of representative nano-
materials that were close to commercialization (OECD 2011). The OECD selected
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13 representative nanomaterials for risk assessments and South Africa took the
pro-active step to become lead sponsor for one of those materials – gold – despite
there being 35 member in the committee, and despite South Africa not being an
OECD country (South Africa received an observer status in the working party).
Most of the government’s resources were soon directed toward the risk assessment
of gold nanoparticles and four prominent South African research institutes subse-
quently focused on the hazard identiﬁcation, risk characterization, and studying the
physicochemical properties of gold nanoparticles (Gulumian 2012).
Strategic positioning
The rationale for redirecting domestic efforts along the lines of the OECD was that
South Africa wanted ‘to contribute to global efforts to address this challenge of not
knowing the risks of nanomaterials’ (interview September 16, 2011). Similar phrases
were repeatedly put forward by scientists and government ofﬁcials. This stands in
sharp contrast to the Apartheid era, when South African was subject to international
sanctions that sought to isolate the country. This not only prevented scientists from
‘contributing to global efforts’, the South African Government actively used to isola-
tion as an element in nation-building. For instance Edwards and Hecht (2010) show
how the ‘South African’ nature of nuclear systems became the subject of political
struggles. Whereas the Apartheid state sough to demonstrate self-sufﬁciency by
building nuclear systems despite the international isolation, anti-Apartheid activities
in turn challenged such claims by demonstrating the dependence of South Africa’s
nuclear capabilities on international knowledge networks. In the case of nanotechnol-
ogy risks, however, contributions to global efforts could be stated publically in a con-
text where the government actively tried to put the Apartheid legacy behind them.
The strong emphasis on international collaboration further can be understood by
looking at the way actors in South Africa perceive the beneﬁts of nanotechnology.
Whereas India sees itself as a future world leader that should chart its own course,
South Africa generally positions itself as a small and vulnerable player and partly
invested in nanotechnology because it did not want to fall behind the rest of the
world. The national nanotechnology strategy states that ‘ignoring nanotechnology’
may result in a decline in competitiveness of manufacturing industry and a decrease
in international investments in South Africa because of ‘non-compliance with
advances in world technology’ (DST 2006, 15). These concerns are particularly per-
tinent in view of recent economic experiences in South Africa, where a series of
neoliberal reforms that were meant to strengthen the value of the Rand after the end
of the Apartheid, resulted in a disadvantageous exposure to international competition
and a resultant decline in competitiveness (Carmody 2002). In such a liberalized
market, the aim of the nanotechnology strategy to develop nanotechnologies in the
industrial sector is essentially dependent on the possibility to export these products
to international markets, thus making adherence to best practices in risk governance
of paramount importance.
The choice to take the lead in assessing the risks of nanotechnology gold directly
followed from the government’s strategy for realizing nanotechnology beneﬁts. A
major driver for South Africa to funnel funds toward the ‘industrial cluster’ was the
fear that foreign nanotechnology developments could negatively impact South
African exports. Several commentators had pointed out that the special properties of
nanotechnology could theoretically be used to develop cheap materials mimicking
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the properties of rare and expensive materials, such as gold, thereby threatening
developing country exports of rare minerals (Schummer 2007; Wetter 2010). As the
world’s leading exporter of gold and platinum, South Africa’s investments in the
‘industrial cluster’ aimed to use nanotechnology in order to ﬁnd new uses for its
most important minerals, which was for instance put into practice by establishing
one of the country’s two nanotechnology innovation centerss at MINTEK, a gold
research institute. On the one hand this knowledge about gold gave South Africa a
strategic vantage point to investigate the risks of gold nanoparticles. One govern-
ment ofﬁcial told me South Africa decided to focus their risk research on gold ‘be-
cause we are rich in gold and have been using gold nanomaterials for quite a long
time’ (interview September 28, 2011). On the other hand, investigating the risks of
golden nanoparticles could serve the commercial pursuit of novel applications for
gold. For South African companies that want to put their products on the European
market, so a prominent toxicologist told me, it is important to keep a close eye on
international developments related to risk.
As this example also shows, the South African Government’s approach to nan-
otechnology risk was further underpinned by a relation between risk and beneﬁts
where the governance of risk was seen as a precondition for reaping the beneﬁts.
Another prominent nanotoxicologist, who repeatedly represented the South African
Government at the OECD, for instance noted that the health, safety and environment
research platform was established ‘to ensure nanotechnology-driven beneﬁts (…) are
exploited safely, responsibly, and sustainably’ (Gulumian 2012 [italics added]). And
at the launch of the HSE platform, the government ofﬁcial responsible for nanotech-
nology clearly stated that ‘the expected outcomes as stated in the research plan [the
nanotechnology strategy], and the strategic objectives, cannot be adequately realized
if the health, safety and risk issues associated with the development and application
of nanotechnology are known and given the necessary attention’ (Molapisi 2009).
This strongly contrasts to India, where risks and beneﬁts were seen as a trade-off
and where any attention to risks was perceived as potentially threatening the bene-
ﬁts. In South Africa, on the contrary, governance of risk was seen as a precondition
for reaping the beneﬁts.
Nanotechnology was eventually also constituted as an object of risk by the South
African Government. After arriving in South Africa through a variety of channels
ranging from email lists to conference visits, nanotechnology was quickly consti-
tuted as a risk object when risk discourses quickly circulated in the networks of the
SANi and the government. In contrast to the international isolation under the Apart-
heid Government, the South African Government closely coordinated their work
with international activities through the OECD. By working on gold nanoparticles,
South Africa aimed to contribute to international research efforts while at the same
time strengthening their strategic position as was outlined in their nanotechnology
strategy. Considering the governance of risk as a precondition for reaping the bene-
ﬁts in an international market place, they focused their efforts on those nanotech-
nologies that South Africa hopes to reap most beneﬁts from.
Conclusion
The starting point for this article was that the presence of risk discourses – or the
risk colonization of nanotechnology in developing countries – is something that
needs to be explained. While the growing investments in emerging science and
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technology by countries in the global South increases the likelihood that they are
exposed to the potential harms of those sciences and technologies, this does not
mean that these harms are also understood and dealt with in terms of risk. Nanotech-
nology risk in India and South Africa offered a good case study in this respect as
risk discourses were initially absent in these countries and emerged only after they
had been well-established in other countries. I have proposed that the way risk dis-
courses ‘travel’ to nanotechnology in India and South Africa can be investigated by
taking a relational perspective on risk. I traced how nanotechnology was constituted
as a risk object using a comparative approach, drawing upon semi-structured qualita-
tive interviews with key stakeholders in India and South Africa as well as a wide
range of written sources.
The comparative approach adopted in this article revealed that the way nanotech-
nology is constituted as a risk object varies from place to place. Nanotechnology
was constituted as a risk object by the Indian Government after the Canadian devel-
opment organization funded a civil society organization, who heavily drew upon
international literature on nanotechnology risks; after toxicologists learned about
nanotechnology risks in the United States and partly funded their research by partici-
pating in European funding schemes; and after a variety of actors learned about
nanotechnology risks through emails, newspapers, international conferences and
foreign collaborators. Foreign discussions about nanotechnology risks thus exerted
a signiﬁcant inﬂuence on the emergence of risk discourses within the Indian
Government – risk discourses ‘travelled’ from abroad, one could say – but risk dis-
courses also travelled from other domains within India: concerns about nanotechnol-
ogy also partly became understood in terms of risks because of the inﬂuence exerted
by risk discourses in the case of agricultural biotechnology. In South Africa toxicol-
ogists also started working on nanotechnology risks but nanotechnology was consti-
tuted as a risk object mostly after actors learned about it through a variety of
everyday acts of communications, such as emails, newsletters, and contacts with for-
eign collaborators. Also in South Africa foreign risk discourses played an important
role in the constitution of nanotechnology as a risk object by the government. But
whereas the Indian and South African Government adopted a risk discourse that
originated in Europe and North America, they were not unilaterally forced to do so
through international agreements, as is for instance regularly argued in the case of
intellectual property rights and trade regulations. This article found that in the case
of nanotechnology risk discourses, international email lists and conferences were at
least as inﬂuential.
The comparative approach further enabled us to see that once nanotechnology
was constituted as a risk object, nanotechnology was identiﬁed, understood, and
made relevant as an object of risk in rather different ways. In India for instance risk
is predominantly understood as a potential threat to the beneﬁts of nanotechnology.
The government rather reluctantly took up the governance of risk after being faced
with increasing pressure by civil society, scientists, and industry, as well as changes
in the domain of agricultural biotechnology. They eventually set up a regulatory
board whose activities largely consists of monitoring foreign developments and tak-
ing action when there is sufﬁciently certain knowledge about both the existence of
risks and the best ways to deal with them. In South Africa, on the contrary, the gov-
ernance of risk is considered a precondition for reaping the beneﬁts and was quickly
embraced by actors across the board. The government set up a research platform to
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investigate how best to deal with risks, which was quickly superseded by South
Africa’s participation in the OECD working party on manufactured nanomaterials.
South Africa subsequently geared its activities to both global efforts and their
attempts to reap the beneﬁts of nanotechnology by pro-actively taking the lead in
investigating the risks of golden nanoparticles. In other words, the way ‘risk is iden-
tiﬁed, understood, and made relevant’ (Boholm 2015) does not remain stable as new
technologies are constituted as risk objects in new places.
Certainly the emergence of risk discourses is related to some of the broad condi-
tions under which risk discourses emerged in Europe and Northern America, such as
the development of markets and the responsibilization of the state to provide safety
to their citizens. But the differences in both the way risk discourses emerged and the
form they eventually took in India and South Africa can best be understood by look-
ing at the local context in which risk discourses emerged. The methodology section
highlighted that the way risk discourses emerge should be seen as a reciprocal pro-
cess whereby on the one hand the constitution of a risk object changes the way
objects are viewed and on the other hand this process is simultaneously informed by
the conditions already present in the new context. For instance, in India, the govern-
ment’s decision to create a separate regulatory board should be understood in light
of the long tradition to create technology-speciﬁc institutions as part of their
mission-oriented research endeavors and the view of risk as a potential threat to the
beneﬁts directly follows from the almost unquestioned position of science and
technology as bringers of development. In South Africa, risk discourses circulated
so quickly because various stakeholders had been strongly organized in the South
African Nanotechnology initiative in order to be able to speak in one voice to a gov-
ernment that was otherwise skeptical of investments in new science and technology.
The decision to focus their efforts with respect to risk on golden nanoparticles
should be understood in the same light, where the beneﬁts of nanotechnology were
primarily said to reside in already existing national priorities that were deemed under
threat.
Just like the differences in which various European and North American coun-
tries calculate, evaluate, compare and manage risk objects should be understood as
the products of a variety of local conditions (e.g. Vogel 1986; Löfstedt and Vogel
2001; Jasanoff 2005), so the different ways in which nanotechnology was consti-
tuted as an object of risk by the governments of India and South Africa are
grounded in local histories. One element of the local context found in this article
that was not yet so much highlighted in the literature on the conditions under which
risk discourses emerge is the way countries position themselves in relation to foreign
countries. The pro-active step of South Africa to become the lead sponsor for golden
nanoparticles within the OECD working party for instance cannot be understood
without looking at the way South Africa positions itself as a small and vulnerable
player on the global stage that is eager to undo the international isolation endured
under Apartheid. And we saw that India justiﬁed its strategy to follow foreign devel-
opments by positioning itself as a developing country, which subsequently could not
be expected to take the lead, despite the fact that they do claim to take the lead
when it comes to the beneﬁts. As the latter example shows, the distinction between
the ‘country’ and ‘the foreign’ is not of analytical value in studying how risk objects
are constituted in particular geographies, they are also drawn upon by countries
themselves in order to inform the way risk objects are constituted.
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Risk discourses have travelled beyond the conﬁnes of the wealthy countries that
were ﬁrst characterized as risk societies. As countries worldwide increasingly engage
with modern sciences and technologies – as both consumers, producers and develop-
ers – it becomes increasingly important to gain insight into their understanding of
risk. In doing so, it is paramount not merely to juxtapose best-practices developed in
Europe and North America to the state-of-the-art in so-called developing countries
in order to assess whether or not countries in the global South live up to ‘global
standards’. Rather, as countries from the global South will take in a more prominent
position in international negotiations over science and technology-related trade regu-
lations, risk governance, and standards, the notion of what ‘global standards’ are is
likely to shift in ways that are informed by risk discourses in the global South.
Gaining insight into local risk discourses, as can be made visible by investigating
how risk discourses emerge, offers a view onto the different faces of the world risk
society.
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